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Fair Representation in Local Government 
Ruth Greenwood* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article focuses on my work in Illinois to use the Voting Rights Act1 (VRA) to 
improve minority representation at the local level, but the themes and findings are 
applicable across the country because many states have growing minority populations in the 
suburbs just outside of large city centers.2 These minority populations tend to be much less 
segregated than the minority communities in the cities,3 and so it is more difficult to use 
Section 2 of the VRA4  (“Section 2”) to ensure both descriptive and substantive 
representation. I recommend the use of fair representation systems like ranked choice and 
cumulative voting (with multi-member districts) to improve minority representation in these 
decreasingly segregated areas. I introduce three case studies from Illinois to highlight the 
numerous burdens facing those that seek to reform their local government redistricting 
systems. I finish with some thoughts on how litigation and legislative advocacy may be used 
to promote fair representation systems in local government. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be . . . represented. 
No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”5 
John Stuart, Mill 1862  
 
Representation in a democracy is “a substitute for the meeting of citizens in 
person.”6 Federal, state, and local governments could not function if all of the millions 
of citizens with a stake in the decisions of government were involved in every decision. 
Americans long ago decided that they did not want a single leader to determine issues 
                                                 
*  Ruth Greenwood is the Deputy Director of Redistricting for the Campaign Legal Center and an Adjunct 
Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. This Article adapts and expands the research I 
did for a report while at the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, The Color of 
Representation, CHICAGO LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, INC. (Apr. 2015)  
http://www.votingrightsillinois.org/color-of-representation. I would like to thank Annabelle Harless, 
Devin Race, J. Cunyon Gordon, George Cheung, Jorge Sanchez, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Maria Aracelia 
Rosas Urbano, Mark and Kathy Kuehner, and Willie Scott for their inspiration and assistance in this 
important work. 
1  52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10301–14 (West 2016). 
2  William H. Frey, Melting Pot Cities and Suburbs: Racial and Ethnic Change in Metro America in the 
2000s, METROPOLITAN POL’Y PROGRAMS AT BROOKINGS, 9–11 (May 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/0504_census_ethnicity_frey.pdf. 
3  See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 
1343–48 (2016).  
4  52 U.S.C.A. § 10301. 
5  John Stuart Mill, Representative Government, in THREE ESSAYS BY JOHN STUART MILL 143, 252 (Oxford 
1960). 
6  HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 191 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (quoting 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, THE FEDERALIST NO.52, in THE FEDERALIST 269, 
270 (Max Beloff ed. 1948)). 
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of the commonwealth. Thus, governmental systems were chosen whereby some people 
represent others to determine the rules by which we live. 
To be represented has four relevant meanings in the context of voting rights.7 
One can be said to be represented if:8 
1. she can register, vote, and have that vote count; 
2. she can join with her community to elect candidates of their choice; 
3. people with the same demographic or social characteristics are part of a 
governmental decision making body (I will refer to this as descriptive 
representation); and 
4. there is a congruence between the actions and behavior of a representative 
and one’s policy preferences (I will refer to this as substantive 
representation).   
The first form of representation is not a focus of this Article but has been a focus of 
recent successful litigation efforts across the country.9 It is the latter three types of 
representation that this Article discusses. 
Recognizing that representation is required in a democracy is only the first 
step. A community must then decide how it will choose its representatives. What 
mechanism is chosen will depend on a community’s conception of democracy and of 
representation. Is democracy served by a purely majoritarian representative body 
whereby representatives do only what those they represent want and the decision 
made in each case is by majority rule (majoritarianism)?10 Is it served by a 
representative body where the most talented members of society are trusted to 
deliberate and act in favor of the national interest, even if it involves unpopular 
choices (trusteeship)?11 Is it served by a representative body that is a vibrant 
marketplace of ideas, where every demographic and interest group is represented, 
and decision makers form different coalitions come to different compromises 
depending on the issue (pluralism)?12 Perhaps a little of each of these drove the 
decisions of the Founders to establish the decision-making structures of federal 
government. 
The federal government structure is laid out in our almost-unamendable 
Constitution,13 but the structure of a local government is, in many states, relatively 
                                                 
7  For a full discussion of definitions of representation, see PITKIN, supra note 6, at 1–11. 
8  Adapted from PITKIN, supra note 6, at 38–59. 
9  Successful litigation on this form of representation has occurred in Wisconsin, One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. 
v. Thomsen, No. 15-cv-324-jpd, 2016 WL 4059222 (W.D. Wis. July 29, 2016), Texas, Veasey v. Abbott, 
830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), North Carolina, North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. 
McCroy, No. 1:13CV861, 2016 WL 1650774 (M.D.N.C. April 25, 2016), and Kansas, Fish v. Kobach, No. 
16-2105-JAR-JPO, 2016 WL 2866195, May 17, 2016 (D.C. Kan).. 
10  See PITKIN, supra note 6, at 30. 
11  Id. at 181. 
12  Id. at 191. 
13  Eric Posner, The U.S. Constitution Is Impossible to Amend, SLATE (May 5, 2014, 4:22 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/amending_the_constitution
_is_much_too_hard_blame_the_founders.html. 
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easily amended. For example, in Illinois, home rule jurisdictions14 can change their 
system of government (that is, their county, town, or school board) by majority vote 
at a general election after collecting a relatively small number of signatures to place 
the question on the ballot.15  
At the local level then, we are all potential founders. 
In a world of relatively infinite choice, what system of democracy suits local 
government? And, therefore, what system of representation is preferable? Some 
guidance can be drawn from Hanna Pitkin’s seminal 1967 book, The Concept of 
Representation. Pitkin found that political decisions are “questions about action, 
about what should be done; consequently they involve both facts and value 
commitments.”16 While decisions based on facts may be delegated to experts, 
decisions based on value commitments—like the decisions of what rules a community 
wants to live by—require diverse representation.  
Not every type of diversity will be relevant for representation. For example, it 
is hard to think of a reason why blue-eyed people need specific representation that 
they could not get from brown-or green-eyed people. Additionally, in some 
communities, different religions or ages need not be represented, but in others, 
religion or age may be a key cleavage in a community, and so establishing a system 
that ensures diverse representation with respect to religion or age will be necessary. 
In every community in America one thing is for certain: race and ethnicity will be an 
issue that requires diverse representation.17 
This Article proceeds as follows: It starts by defining minority representation 
and outlining the normative and practical case for promoting minority 
representation, highlights the importance of focusing on local government 
representation, discusses the legal routes currently available to improve minority 
representation, goes through two case studies of work I have done at the local level 
to try to improve minority representation (in Joliet and Blue Island), and concludes 
with thoughts for the strategies that can be used going forward to advocate and 
litigate for local government structures that will better protect and promote minority 
representation. 
I. MINORITY REPRESENTATION 
If the goal of democracy is majority rule, why is pluralism or an explicit 
protection of racial justice needed? This question strikes at the basic paradox of 
                                                 
14  See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6. 
15  See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-7 (2016) (the number of signatures required is equal to 8% of total vote of 
that jurisdiction in most recent gubernatorial election). 
16  PITKIN, supra note 6, at 212. 
17  See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Race Racialism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age 
of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010); Mario L. Barnes, Reflections on a Dream World: Race, Post-
Race and the Question of Making It Over, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 6 (2009); Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLORBLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL 
INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2006); see also JOHN D. GRIFFIN & BRIAN NEWMAN, MINORITY 
REPORT 196 (2008) (citing Kinder and Sanders 1996, and Sniderman and Carmines 1997 as examples of 
how race continues to divide American society and politics). 
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democracy—can a society be equally committed to majority rule and minority 
protection?18  Because it conflicts with government by the majority, the commitment 
to minority protection must be grounded in some other value. A commitment to 
minority representation can be grounded in pluralism and/or a commitment to racial 
justice. Failing to focus on minority representation is not a choice in favor of race 
neutrality, but instead a de facto vote against racial justice.  
For minority representation to exist, all four types of representation outlined 
above should be present. That is, minority communities must be able to register and 
vote, to elect candidates of their choice, and to be both descriptively and substantively 
represented in federal, state, and local government. These types of representation 
stand in contrast to various kinds of disenfranchisement and political 
disempowerment minorities have experienced in America’s history. 
A. The Voting Rights Act  
It wasn’t until the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965 that part of the promise of 
the Fifteenth Amendment was codified by Congress.19 Though passed in direct 
response to the violence in Selma, Alabama, on Bloody Sunday, March 7, 1965, the 
aims of the VRA were broader than simply allowing Black people to register to vote 
without fear of losing their lives. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s views on the topic were 
summarized by Lani Guinier in 1991: “King advocated full political participation by 
an enlightened electorate to elect blacks to key political positions, to liberalize the 
political climate in the United States and to influence the allocation of resources.”20 
Guinier also notes that Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP and Chairman 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights (LCCR), advocated for the VRA before the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, on the grounds that eliminating voting restrictions 
would mean that elected officials “will become responsive to the will of all the 
people.”21 
Provisions protecting language minority communities (Latinos, Asian 
Americans, American Indians, and Native Alaskans and Hawaiians) were not 
                                                 
18  See Alexis de Tocqueville, Tyranny of the Majority, in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 306 (Schocken Books 
1961); see also JAQUES DERRIDA, ROGUES: TWO ESSAYS ON REASON 31–36 (Pascale-Anne Brault & 
Michael Naas trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2005). 
19  There are other statutes that indirectly protect minority voting rights by protecting voting rights of 
particular communities that include people of color, e.g., the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–10 (1993); the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C. § 
1973ff-7 (1998); the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545 (2002); and the Military 
and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-7 (2009). 
20  Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and The Theory of Black Electoral 
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1084 n.26 (1991) (citing MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 
166 (1963)). 
21  Id. at 1077 n.26 (citing Voting Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 377–80 (1965) (statement of Roy Wilkins). 
2017] Fair Representation in Local Government 201 
included in the VRA until 1975.22 These were added to help non-English-speaking 
voters to “cast an effective ballot . . . .”23  
The definition of minority political participation used during the 1975 debates 
included registering, voting, running for office, and holding office as civic 
participation goals.24 The 1975 Act’s added protections were written to apply to 
“language minority groups,” defined as “persons who are American Indian, Asian 
American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage.”25 
B. Promoting Minority Representation 
i.  Registering, Voting, and Having that Vote Count Today 
The removal of practices that directly prevented minority voters from 
registering and voting (for example, literacy tests, and some of the practices 
prevented through Section 5 preclearance, such as not opening voter registration 
opportunities when Black citizens appeared at the relevant office to register) 
supported the most basic type of minority representation: allowing people of color to 
register, vote, and have that vote count. 
There are still laws that disproportionately disenfranchise voters of color, such 
as felon disenfranchisement laws, photo ID laws, citizenship requirements, and 
restrictions on early voting that are either currently on the books or are being 
advanced in legislatures or through ballot initiatives.26 Advocates for minority 
representation are using Section 2 of the VRA somewhat effectively27 where previous 
litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment has not been successful.28 
ii. Electing Candidates of the Minority Community’s Choice 
The VRA, though originally interpreted by the Supreme Court to protect 
against only intentional discrimination with respect to the right to vote, was clarified 
by Congress in 1982 such that today it prohibits systems of election that prevent 
minority communities from electing candidates of their choice.29 The classic example 
of such a system is a town council that elects all of its representatives at large, 
meaning that every voter chooses someone for each of, say, seven positions. The result 
                                                 
22  The expansion was both through the coverage formula in Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973–1973aa-6 (1965), and the addition of Section 203 that required election materials to be printed 
in multiple languages in areas where there was a significant community with a common language that 
also spoke English less than well. 
23  Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1, 117 (1975). 
24  Id. at 39–58. 
25  Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-
rights-act (last updated August 8, 2015). 
26  For a full list of restrictive voting laws introduced and passed in 2015, see Voting Laws Roundup 2015, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 3, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-
2015#Restrictive. 
27  See supra text accompanying note 9.  
28  See generally Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
29  52 U.S.C.A. § 10301(b). 
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of at-large systems is that the majority white population, if there is racial polarization 
in voting, will elect all seven members, and the minority community will never be 
able to elect a candidate to the local office. In places where it is possible to divide the 
jurisdiction into single-member districts (SMDs) such that one or more will have a 
majority of minority citizens, Section 2 of the VRA has been interpreted to require 
that SMDs (or another remedy) be implemented.30  
iii. Descriptive Representation 
The VRA says nothing explicitly about descriptive representation, but the 
Senate, in passing the amendments to Section 2 in 1982, added in a list of factors that 
a court must consider as part of the “totality of the circumstances” test. 31 Factor 
seven, in particular, is concerned with descriptive representation: “the extent to 
which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the 
jurisdiction.”  
In many cases, the VRA’s protection of communities electing candidates of 
their choice has resulted in a protection of descriptive representation because people 
of color have largely been the choice of the minority community and white people have 
largely been the choice of the white community. For example, at the congressional 
level in elections from 1966–96 (the thirty years after the VRA was passed) only 35 
of the 6,667 elections in white majority districts provided Black winners (that is 
0.005%).32 There are more white winners in majority Black or Latino districts than 
this low rate, but not a sufficient amount to threaten the ability of representatives of 
color to be elected at the local, state, and national level. 
iv. Substantive Representation 
Substantive representation can have both an individual representative 
component and a whole legislature/policy outcomes component. With respect to 
individual representatives, the VRA protection of communities of color’s ability to 
elect candidates of their choice should protect substantive representation (if the 
community votes in its self-interest and is able to hold the legislator to account). In 
addition, the Senate factors in the Section 2 amendments to the VRA outline the 
issues that a court should consider as part of the “totality of the circumstances” test 
required by the section. One of the Senate factors requires a court to look at whether 
the relevant minority group bears the effects of discrimination in areas such as 
education, employment, and health.  
Additionally, political scientists have found strong evidence that substantive 
representation follows directly from descriptive representation. For example, Kerry 
L. Haynie finds, in analyzing agenda-setting behavior, that “a legislator’s race tends 
                                                 
30  See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
31  See S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., at 28–29 (1982). 
32  DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION 12 (1999). 
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to have a stronger effect on substantive representation than does a legislator’s party 
membership.” 33 
With respect to whole legislature/policy outcomes, the story is somewhat 
different due to the nature of winner-take-all district elections. Whether substantive 
policy outcomes are promoted by the VRA depends on the size and distribution of the 
minority communities and the level of racially polarized voting. 
The need to divide minority representation into a substantive and descriptive 
component reveals how differently the political world is experienced by whites and 
people of color (and hence why it is important to approach the political world with an 
appreciation of racial difference). Since ninety percent of elected officials are white 
(and sixty-five percent are white men),34 a white person will almost never need to 
worry about whether the candidate who will substantively represent him will also 
descriptively represent him.  
C. The Benefits of Minority Representation 
Q: Now why would you come from Crittenden County to participate in a fundraiser for a county 
race that was basically a local race to Philips County? 
 
A: Well, the reason I would come, first of all, there are no blacks elected to a county position in 
eastern Arkansas and no blacks serving in the House of Representatives in eastern Arkansas 
and no blacks elected to anything other than school boards in districts that are predominantly 
black. And I feel like blacks should be elected to public office because they should have a chance 
to serve. 
 
And I want to help get blacks elected so little black children can see them serving and I want 
to dispell (sic) the myth that some white kids might have that blacks can’t serve or shouldn’t 
be serving at the courthouse. And when my little girl goes to the courthouse or when other 
little girls go to the courthouse, I want them to be able to see black people working up there. 
 
And if we can get some blacks elected at the local level, eventually we can—blacks will have 
the expertise and we can groom them to the point where they can run for the state legislature 
and other positions . . . . 
Ben McGee, 198835 
i. Black Americans 
Though the Black community is not homogenous, and Black community groups 
will differ in their support for various policies and laws, it is possible to find a large 
                                                 
33  KERRY L. HAYNIE, AFRICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATORS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 25, 30 (2001). Haynie 
justifies assessing agenda-setting behavior as a method of assessing substantive representation by 
relying on R. Douglas Arnold’s finding that “analyzing legislator’s bill introductions is often superior to 
a reliance on roll-call votes for attempting to establish a linkage between constituency interests or 
preferences and the legislative behavior of representatives.” Id. at 25. 
34  Do America’s Elected Officials Reflect Our Population?, WHO LEADS US, 
http://wholeads.us/electedofficials/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).  
35  LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 54 (1994) (citing Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 686 F.Supp. 
1365 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff’d by an equally divided court, 890 F.2d 1423 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (trial 
transcript at 654–55)). 
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body of common ground between black citizens on questions of public policy, ideology, 
and candidate choice, and therefore to define “Black interests,” for the purpose of 
studying whether these interests are furthered by an increased presence of black 
legislators, by greater seniority of black legislators, or other practices aimed at 
promoting minority representation. Kerry L. Haynie finds that Black citizens “have 
been the most cohesive and consistent political subgroup in U.S. politics.”36  
This coherence has made it easier for researchers to draw conclusions as to 
whether white or Black representatives are better able to represent the views of the 
Black community. Canon researched thousands of Congressional representatives 
over a thirty-year period and found that  
white representatives from districts that are 30–40 percent Black can largely ignore 
their Black constituents, and many do. Black representatives from districts that are 
30–40 percent white cannot ignore their white constituents because they are operating 
in an institution that is about 86 percent white and a nation that is 82.5 percent white.37  
He concludes that there is “very little support” for the claim that “whites are just as 
able to represent black interests as blacks.”38  
Additionally, Haynie, in analyzing state legislatures, found that Black 
members did not need to be in positions of power (for example, on legislative 
committees) to exert an influence over substantive outcomes, instead “the mere 
presence of African Americans in state legislatures . . . was sufficient to yield 
significant institutional and governmental responsiveness to black interests.”39 
Haynie also examined the introduction of bills by state legislatures and found that 
“the race of the representative has a powerful and statistically significant effect on 
the introduction of traditional civil rights legislation.”40   
A corollary of the Canon and Haynie findings is that “districts with a majority 
black population had no significant impact on whether legislators representing such 
districts introduced black interest legislation.”41 That means that majority-Black 
districts without a Black elected official are not likely to see Black-interest legislation 
introduced on their behalf, even though the minority community voted that 
representative into office. Thus, the candidate of choice of a minority community will 
best represent them substantively if—and only if—that candidate also descriptively 
represents them. There are of course exceptions to this statistical finding: there have 
been and are a small number of majority Black communities that elect white 
candidates to represent them, and those candidates provide substantive 
representation for their communities. Those exceptions do not undercut the link 
between descriptive and substantive representation, but rather should give us hope 
                                                 
36  HAYNIE, supra note 33, at 19. 
37  CANON, supra note 32, at 13. 
38  Id. at 12. 
39  HAYNIE, supra note 33, at 90.  
40  Id. at 30. 
41  Id.  
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that in a future time it will be possible for all white candidates to represent all of 
their constituents, not just the white ones.  
ii. Latinos 
The Latino community is not as politically cohesive as the Black community, 
largely because of group differences by country of origin, e.g., Mexico, Puerto Rico, 
and Cuba.42 This makes it difficult to assess whether on the whole, the Latino 
community is able to get “what it wants” because there is no “it.”  
However, it is possible to assess whether Latinos are more likely to get the 
outcomes they desire than white Americans. It has been shown that, in Congress, 
Latinos, like Black Americans, are less likely to have policies implemented that they 
care about when their representatives are white, with the exception of districts that 
are over fifty percent Latino and represented by white members.43 In the latter case, 
Latinos are as likely to have their policies represented by their congressional 
members as the whites in that district.44 Thus, having a Latino representative 
generally leads to substantive representation for Latinos. 
For Latinos (as well as Blacks), the substantive representation that results 
from descriptive representation also goes beyond just being more generally liberal. 
An analysis of voting patterns in several Congresses shows that “rather than simply 
greater intensity on a liberal-conservative spectrum, which generally emphasizes 
economic/class cleavages, minority representatives see a second, racial dimension of 
policies as highly salient.”45 This finding also tends to discredit those who say that 
substantive representation for minorities can be achieved by simply increasing the 
number of liberal representatives in office. White representatives—even liberal 
ones—do not have the “sense of racially ‘linked fate’” or “personal experience with 
discrimination” to draw upon, which shows up in how they vote.46 
iii. Asian Americans 
Though the Asian American community does not share a common history, 
language, or country of origin, political scientists conclude that an “Asian American 
identity does exist and frequently works as a collective group.”47 Unlike Black 
                                                 
42  See JOHN D. GRIFFIN & BRIAN NEWMAN, MINORITY REPORT 51 (2008). 
43  See id. at 197. 
44  See id. 
45  Robert R. Preuhs & Rodney E. Hero, A Different Kind of Representation: Black and Latino Descriptive 
Representation and the Role of Ideological Cuing, 64 POL. RES. Q. 157, 157–71 (2011). 
46  See id. at 158, 160. Preuhs and Hero used a measure of how liberal a representative was (the DW 
NOMINATE score) along with scores on race issues from the NAACP (for Blacks) and NHLA (National 
Hispanic Leadership Council) to analyze voting patterns. They found that for white liberals, the DW 
NOMINATE score was highly explanatory of voting patterns whereas for Black and Latino 
representatives, the scores from NAACP and NHLA indicating how sensitive a candidate is to minority 
issues were far more predictive of representatives votes on certain issues. Id. 
47  Neilan Chaturvedi, Responding to Silence: Asian American Representation through Bill Sponsorship 
and Co-Sponsorship (2011 Annual Meeting Paper), AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 5–6 (last revised Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902228. 
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Americans and Latinos, Asian Americans, though exhibiting a reasonable level of 
political cohesion, largely do not exhibit party loyalty.48 
An example of Asian political cohesion is the fight to keep an Asian 
neighborhood together during a redistricting process in New York in the 1990s. 
Latinos challenged the Twelfth Congressional District in New York, and a group of 
Asian Americans intervened to argue that the redrawn district should not split up 
their community.49 The community was defined by common neighborhoods, language, 
level of education, employment in similar industries, use of public transport, and 
immigration status.50 The Court found this argument compelling, and the first 
constitutionally permissible Asian-influence district was formed. The district 
remains a multi-racial opportunity district (with 40% Latino and 20% Asian 
American population).51  
When there are common interests amongst Asian American groups,52 it is 
possible to study whether Asian American legislators effectively represent those 
interests, and it has been found that they do, indeed, further such interests. 53 
iv. Minority Representatives as Role Models 
Guinier explains role model theory as Black representatives “who convey the 
message ‘We Have Overcome’ and inspire those not yet overcoming. Thus, in general, 
Black role models are powerful symbolic reference points for those worried about the 
continued legacy of past discrimination.”54  
The most prominent example of a candidate of color inspiring others is, of 
course, President Obama. The ability of a Black man to be elected to the highest office 
in the land conveys the message to Black children everywhere that they too can do 
great things even though they may experience racism along the way. Similarly, 
Senator Daniel Inouye served as a role model to a generation of Japanese 
Americans,55 as did Mayor Villaraigosa, Senator Rubio, and Congressman Castro for 
Latinos. 
 
 
                                                 
48  See Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Voting Rights and Representation: A Perspective from the 
Northeast, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 739, 764 n.163 (2001) (“Political cohesion around candidates can be 
discerned, but party loyalty is largely absent.”). 
49  Id. at 766–67. 
50  See id. at 766–67. 
51  New York’s 12th Congressional District in the 1990s is now the 7th District, and is still represented by 
Nydia Vela ́squez. The District is 43% Latino and 19% Asian according to the 2013 American 
Community Survey estimates. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2013 American Community Survey (2013), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml. 
52  See Magpantay, supra note 48, at 768 (explaining that communities of interest can be identified within 
the Asian American community). 
53  See Chaturvedi, supra note 47, at 20 (“Asian American legislators represent Asian Americans well.”). 
54  GUINIER, supra note 35, at 57. 
55  See Paul Watanabe, Remembrance: Daniel Inouye Was My Role Model, COGNOSCENTI (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2012/12/20/daniel-inouye-paul-watanabe. 
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v. Improved Civic Participation by People of Color 
In 1965, Black voter registration rates were as low as 6.7% in some states.56 
This was the intended outcome of the white power structure in place. Following the 
adoption of the VRA, voter registration rates increased. Voter turnout also largely 
followed a similar trajectory. Guinier theorized in 1994 that this is because there is a 
key role that “group identity plays in mobilizing political participation and 
influencing legislative policy.”57 She noted also that: “blacks can be encouraged to 
participate in the political process, the possibility of electing a ‘first’ Black tends to 
increase election day turnout. Indeed, the courts and commentators have recognized 
that the inability to elect Black candidates depresses black political participation.”58  
Studies of each of the minority groups under consideration bear out this 
hypothesis. For Blacks, this effect was dramatically illustrated in the 2008 election 
where black turnout eclipsed that of white turnout for the first time,59 likely because 
Black voters wanted to elect the first black President. Additionally, political scientists 
have found a link between the election of black mayors and greater Black political 
participation.60 
For Latinos, a study of Southern California over five years shows that Latino 
voter turnout increases when Latino voters have a chance to elect their candidate of 
choice out of a majority-minority district.61 That boost to turnout increases with each 
additional overlapping district where electing a Latino is possible: the highest 
turnout came from Latino voters who lived in overlapping majority-minority districts 
for State Assembly, State Senate, and U.S. House of Representatives.62 
For Asian Americans, Taofang Huang finds that Asian Americans are more 
likely to vote when an Asian American is a candidate, particularly when the 
candidate’s ties to a specific Asian country are a prominent part of his or her 
presentation during a campaign.63 
It seems likely that, beyond mayoral races, increased minority representation 
at the local level will drive minority civic participation. For example, each additional 
Latino majority-minority district increases turnout by the Latino community. Thus, 
descriptive representation should increase substantive representation on both ends; 
the elected official is more likely to take the interests of the minority community 
                                                 
56  Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://epic.org/privacy/voting/register/intro_c.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
57  GUINIER, supra note 35, at 57. 
58  Id. at 58. 
59  See Thom File, The Diversifying Electorate—Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2012 (and 
Other Recent Elections), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2013), 
http://census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2013/demo/p20-568.pdf. 
60  See ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL, CHANGING WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACK POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 1 (2007). 
61  Matt A. Barreto, Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, The Mobilizing Effect of Majority—Minority 
Districts on Latino Turnout, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 74 (2004). 
62  Id. 
63  See Taofang Huang, Electing One of Our Own: Descriptive Representation of Asian Americans (2010 
Annual Meeting Paper), W. POL. SCI. ASS’N 2, 21, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1580953 (last revised Mar. 31, 2010).  
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seriously and the community will become more engaged, mobilized, and better able 
to hold that representative accountable.  
vi. Confidence in Government 
Jane Mansbridge explains the connection between increased descriptive 
representation, legitimacy, and confidence in government: 
Seeing proportional numbers of members of their group exercising the responsibility 
of ruling with full status in the legislature can enhance de facto legitimacy by making 
citizens, and particularly members of historically underrepresented groups, feel as if 
they themselves were present in the deliberations.64 
Haynie and Guinier accept this argument, but they clarify that they believe 
descriptive representatives will only contribute a basic level of trust in political 
institutions if the minority members actually speak for the communities from which 
they come.65  
The benefit of an increased confidence in government will not necessarily only 
be felt by members of the relevant minority community but may also increase the 
confidence of elected officials that they have made decisions based on the views of the 
entire community, rather than just the white majority. There is also a possibility that 
this confidence could flow over to white voters themselves if they believe that all 
community members are having their voices heard on local decision-making bodies. 
 
vii. Changing Attitudes to Minority Legislators and Minority 
Community Members 
There is some evidence that Black political leadership can help to break down 
the “myth that some white kids might have that Blacks [and other minority 
candidates] can’t serve or shouldn’t be serving.”66 For example, Zoltan Hajnal shows 
that “the transition from white to Black leadership frequently leads to notable shifts 
in white attitudes and behavior.”67 Hajnal argues that this shift in behavior occurs 
where information about the Black political leadership is credible and widely 
disseminated such that the white community perceive their black leader to have real 
                                                 
64  HAYNIE, supra note 33, at 114 (citing Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women 
Represent Women? A Contingent Yes, 61 J. POL. 628, 650 (1999)). 
65  HAYNIE, supra note 33, at 114. 
66  Id. at 63. 
67  HAJNAL, supra note 60, at 7. Unfortunately, Hajanal finds exceptions to his rule, and Chicago is one of 
the notable exceptions: “Although Black representation in most cases leads to decreased racial tension 
and greater acceptance of Black incumbents, there are a select number of cities where racial tension 
remains high, voting continues to be highly racially polarized, and few new white voters begin to 
support Black leaders despite years under Black leadership . . . . Chicago represents perhaps the most 
famous case of ongoing white resistance.” Id. at 123 (though Hajnal can explain the unique 
circumstances that set Chicago out from other cities). 
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control over outcomes and policies, and white community members are therefore 
more likely to reduce their negative attitudes to black leadership.  
At the congressional level, some studies on white voting behavior following 
Black leadership support Hajnal’s findings,68 but some find the opposite result, with 
whites being eight to ten percent less likely to support Black incumbents than white 
incumbents.69 Despite this finding, the number of Black congressional 
representatives that represent majority white districts has increased from zero in 
1960 to six in 2000, representing sixteen percent of all Black representatives.70  
Though change in the level of racially polarized voting is slow, it seems change has 
indeed followed from increased examples of Black leadership (in both majority white 
and majority Black communities). 
The number of Latino and Asian American representatives has only started to 
grow in the past three decades, but the data so far suggest that white voters respond 
to Latino and Asian American leadership positively. Hajnal finds “there does appear 
to be a pattern of changing white behavior in response to experience with Latino 
elected officials. The evidence is clearer for whites who experience Latino leadership 
than it is for whites who live under Asian American incumbents but in both cases 
there are signs that white Americans are learning.”71  
The effect of minority political leadership on white racial attitudes is therefore 
one of caution and hope. Though minority representation “cannot solve all or even 
most of America’s racial ills . . . if it can begin to reduce racial divisions in the political 
arena, then it is a goal well worth pursuing.”72 
viii. Minority Representation and the Representation of Women 
Focusing on minority representation gives us a chance to explore “the 
interaction and coalition formation that may occur between women and 
minority groups with corresponding interests” and to find ways to advance 
representation for both of these underrepresented groups of people.73  
A finding that reveals corresponding interests is that the improvement in 
minority representation over the past few years has largely been driven by 
women of color. This is particularly true for black elected officials. For example, 
in 2001, the increase in Black elected officials in office was entirely due to the 
increase in Black women in office. Since 1998, the number of Black men has 
actually decreased, and overall (from 1970–2005) black female elected officials 
                                                 
68  Id. at 145. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 146. 
71  ZOLTAN HAJNAL, AMERICA’S UNVEVEN DEMOCRACY 153 (2010). 
72  Id. at 161. 
73  Michael D. Minta, Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Political Representation in the United States, 8 POL.& 
GENDER 541, 544 (2012). 
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increased twenty-fold while black male elected officials increased only four-
fold.74  
The fights for gender and racial/ethnic equality should be seen as 
connected because achieving minority representation is not just about 
narrowly satisfying the interests of some racial groups. Rather, it is grounded 
in a view of democracy that says that all of those who are historically or 
currently disempowered still deserve respect and recognition. This connection 
has been important in the advances of racial and gender justice: the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s was dominated by discussions of race, but coalition 
building allowed protections for gender to be included in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.75 
II. MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Now that we have set the boundaries for our discussion of what constitutes 
minority representation and why we may desire to increase it, let us turn our 
attention to local government representation in particular. The starkest recent 
example of the importance of local government in the fight for racial equality comes 
from Ferguson, Missouri. 
Many will remember Ferguson only for the shooting and killing of an unarmed, 
Black teenager, Michael Brown, by a white police officer in 2014.76 A large part of the 
blame for this terrible event was rightly attributed to the racially discriminatory 
culture within the Ferguson Police Department. 77 But there are deeper issues. 
Ferguson, along with St. Louis, is highly segregated not only in housing patterns, but 
also in the distribution of local power.78 Although Ferguson’s population is majority 
Black, it is run by a white mayor and a white police chief, with a police department 
known for brutality against Black79 youth and racist conduct by police officers.  
While Ferguson is over sixty-seven percent Black, its city council included only 
one Black member out of six seats.80 In addition, seventy-seven percent of students 
                                                 
74  Carol Hardy-Fanta et al., Race, Gender, and Descriptive Representation: An Exploratory View of 
Multicultural Elected Leadership in the United States 6 (Sep. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the American Political Science Association). 
75  See Minta, supra note 73, at 544–45. 
76  See, e.g., Editorial, The Death of Michael Brown: Racial History Behind the Ferguson Protests, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/opinion/racial-history-behind-the-ferguson-
protests.html (last visited Aug. 2016). 
77  See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. CIVIL RTS. DIV., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
78  See The Death of Michael Brown, supra note 76. 
79  This report uses “Black” rather than African American to ensure that people without slave ancestry but 
who still hail from Africa are included in the analysis.  The Census Bureau uses both terms in its work. 
This report capitalizes “Black” because the terms Latino and Asian are also usually capitalized. 
80  Karen Shanton, The Problem of African American Underrepresentation on Local Councils, DEMOS.ORG, 
http://www.demos.org/publication/problem-african-american-underrepresentation-city-councils (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2015). 
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in the Ferguson-Florissant School District are Black,81 yet only one school board 
member out of seven total was Black.82 City councils, school boards, and other local 
government systems can influence city agencies and the allocation of resources in 
many important ways. For example, if Ferguson’s city council looked like Ferguson 
itself, it could choose to ensure that the police force is racially diverse, better trained 
to understand racial justice issues, and held accountable for racially disparate 
treatment and racially discriminatory conduct. 
The situation on the ground in Ferguson serves to highlight a truth about local 
governments across our country: they control many aspects of our daily lives, not just 
criminal law but also many other policy areas that are crucial for the civil rights 
agenda. Local government decisions can affect whether a community is integrated,83 
whether public employees include people of color,84 whether police target people 
based on race,85 whether schools disproportionately suspend and expel Black 
students,86 whether food deserts exist,87 whether minority-owned businesses can 
thrive,88 whether people of color’s right to vote is disproportionately burdened,89 
                                                 
81  David Hunn, ACLU Alleges Ferguson-Florissant School District Elections Favor White Candidates, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/aclu-alleges-
ferguson-florissant-school-district-elections-favor-white-candidates/article_f5e8a48f-c586-5593-9aed-
440a353efd86.html. 
82  Jessica Bock, Suspension of Ferguson-Florissant Superintendent Questioned, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 
(Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/suspension-of-ferguson-florissant-
superintendent-questioned/article_d26b81af-7010-55b1-8233-50b33a08bb09.html. 
83  Policies that can influence the level of neighborhood integration including redlining (see, e.g., Alexis C. 
Madrigal, The Racist Housing Policy That Made Your Neighborhood, THE ATLANTIC (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/the-racist-housing-policy-that-made-your-
neighborhood/371439/), and by contrast, an explicit mission in a community to “achieve meaningful and 
lasting diversity throughout Oak Park and the region,” see About us, THE OAK PARK REGIONAL HOUSING 
CTR., http://www.oprhc.org/news-media-releases-updates/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2015). 
84  City policies about standards for hiring can affect diversity in public employees. See, e.g., Lewis v. City 
of Chicago, 643 F.3d 201 (7th Cir. 2011). 
85  See, for example, New York’s “Stop and Frisk” laws that were found to have disparately impacted the 
Black community in New York. See generally Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
86  See, e.g., School Discipline and Disparate Impact, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS (2014), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/School_Disciplineand_Disparate_Impact.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2015) 
(reporting on Fresno’s disparate expulsion referrals for people of color). 
87  Governor Pat Quinn appropriated $10 million to go to cities, towns, and villages across Illinois to 
address the problem of food deserts. City council members had to apply to receive that money, and 
some used the media in that lobbying effort. Landon Cassaman, Rockford ‘“Food Desert” Seeks State 
Funding, WIFR.COM (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://www.wifr.com/home/headlines/Rockford-Food-
Desert-Seeks-State-Funding-164970226.html. 
88  For example, Chicago has a Minority and Women-Owned Business (e.g., (M/WBE)) Certification 
Program that provides contracting opportunities to M/WBE certified companies. Businesses & 
Professionals, CITY OF CHICAGO, http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/ofinterest/bus/mwdbe.html (last 
visited March 12, 2015). 
89  For example, the Department of Justice was asked to investigate the placement of voting machines in 
Franklin County.  The DOJ found that more registered voters were allocated to a single machine in 
predominantly Black precincts, and less registered voters per machine in predominantly white 
precincts (the amount of actual voters for each machine did not show a discriminatory impact).  Dan 
Tokaji, DOJ: No Discrimination in Ohio Election, MORTIZ COLLEGE OF LAW: ELECTION LAW @ MORTIZ 
BLOG (July 5, 2005), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2005/07/doj-no-discrimination-in-ohio-
election.html. In addition, decisions on the allocation of voting machines and election judges can affect 
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whether first-time offenders are prosecuted for felonies under the criminal justice 
system,90 and where for-profit detention centers will be located,91 to name a few 
examples.  
Local governments are often overlooked and understudied compared with 
federal or state governments when it comes to civil rights protections. Local 
governments contribute to whether we make our society a place where people can 
thrive economically, politically, and socially, regardless of their race or ethnicity, or 
whether people of color will face an uphill battle just to live, work, and be educated. 
Local governments are at the forefront of civil rights issues, and so it is at that level 
that we should be trying to ensure that minority communities are fairly represented. 
Unlike Congress and state legislatures, which can contain many hundreds of 
legislators, local school boards and city councils are usually comprised of five to fifteen 
members. Adding even a single minority voice to the deliberations of a small body can 
help the rest of the members better understand issues from the perspective of the 
minority community, and that member can raise issues or introduce motions for a 
vote, without needing to have the support in a legislative committee. Thus, the 
introduction of one or more people of color to a local council has the potential to make 
a larger difference at the local level than at the state or congressional level. 
 
A. Descriptive Representation at the Local Level May Increase Descriptive 
Representation at the National Level 
Even if one’s ultimate goal is to improve state or federal minority 
representation, local minority representation is still fundamentally important to that 
end. Local government representation by minority candidates can “build the bench” 
of candidates for higher office. Minority representatives at the federal level are more 
likely than their White peers to ascend through the political ranks by first serving as 
local elected officials.  
An analysis of the background of the House members in the 114th Congress 
found that while twenty-two percent of White representatives started their political 
careers as elected representatives in local government, representatives of color were 
                                                 
the length of lines in predominantly Black and white communities. In the 2012 election, Black and 
Latino voters waited in lines 2 and 1.5 times as long as white voters. Charles Stewart III & Stephen 
Ansolabehere, Waiting in Line to Vote, SUPPORT THE VOTER 11 (July 28, 2013), 
https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/Waiting-in-Line-to-Vote-White-Paper-Stewart-
Ansolabehere.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
90  The Cook County State’s Attorney is an elected position in local government.  In March 2011, the Cook 
County State’s Attorney implemented a Deferred Prosecution Program to attempt to divert first time 
offenders from the justice system. Deferred Prosecution Program, TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR SAFE 
COMMUNITIES, http://www2.tasc.org/program/deferred-prosecution-program (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
91  The Corrections Corporation of America sought to build a for-profit immigration prison in Joliet in 
2013.  In order for that to go ahead, the Joliet City Council had to approve a special use permit. Ashlee 
Rezin, Pressure Against Joliet’s Proposed For-Profit Immigrant Detention Center Escalates, PROGRESS 
ILL. (May 16, 2013, 7:11 PM), http://www.progressillinois.com/quick-hits/content/2013/05/16/pressure-
against-joliets-proposed-profit-immigrant-detention-center-es. 
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much more likely to have started in local government: 29% percent of Asian American 
representatives, 38% of Black representatives (over 1.5 times as many as white 
representatives), and 44% of Latino representatives (double the number of white 
representatives) started their political careers as local government representatives.92 
This disparity holds specifically for people of color: there is little difference by 
gender (twenty-five percent of male and female representatives started in local 
elected office) and party (twenty-one percent of white Republicans and twenty-four 
percent of white Democrats started in local elected office). 
Therefore, improving local minority representation could create a cadre of 
trained representatives of color that are ready to go on to state and national office to 
represent the interests of their communities. In addition, the reluctance of white 
voters to vote for Black candidates breaks down (even if only to some extent) after 
experiencing Black leadership.93  Thus, the opportunities for local Black candidates 
to get elected to higher office, even if the higher offices are not majority-minority 
communities, improves.  
B. Descriptive Representation Improves Substantive Representation at the 
Local Level 
Descriptive representation for people of color at the local level has the potential 
to significantly improve the lives of communities of color.  
At the county level, a minority commissioner can influence whether services 
and administrative positions will be distributed equitably. For example, in Chilton 
County, Alabama, during the late 1980s, the county decided which roads got paved 
and re-paved (as many county boards do). Their system was ad-hoc and resulted in 
the all-white board of commissioners prioritizing white neighborhoods. Once Bobby 
Agee, the county’s first Black commissioner, was elected in 1988, he was able to 
implement a systematic and objective way to determine which roads got paved.94 As 
a result, Black communities had their roads paved (and the overall process was more 
responsive to community needs). The county board also has the power to suggest and 
appoint administrative personnel. After Bobby Agee was elected, Black 
representatives were appointed by the county board to administrative board 
positions.95 
At the municipal level, descriptive representation for Black Americans has led 
to an improvement in police and social welfare policies for the Black community. 
Having a Black mayor is consistently associated with an increase in the number of 
Black officers on the police force.96 A Black mayor also makes it more likely that there 
                                                 
92  All research for this small study was conducted by the author. 
93  See HAJNAL, supra note 60, at 160–63. (“[B]lack mayoral leadership [can] . . .  change white voting 
behavior, [and] also [] alter white racial attitudes.”). 
94  LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE, 259–60 (1998). 
95  Id. 
96  See Daniel J. Hopkins & Katherine T. McCabe, After It’s Too Late: Estimating the Policy Impacts of Black 
Mayoralties in U.S. Cities, 40 AM. POL. RES. 665, 665–700 (2012); see also Jihong Zhao, Ni He & Nicholas 
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are police department policies that aim to improve the relationship between police 
and the over-policed Black communities, such as citizen accountability boards.97 
Black descriptive representation also leads to better responsiveness of social service 
agencies to the needs of the Black community, particularly when the program 
managers and the representatives engage in community networking and learning.98  
And, at the school board level, school boards that include Latino 
representatives are more likely to hire Latino school administrators, such as 
principals and superintendents, who, in turn, hire more Latino teachers. 
Qualitative99 and quantitative100 studies, including randomized experiments,101 find 
that the academic achievement of Latinos, as well as non-Latinos, increases when a 
school has Latino teachers. In addition, a majority of Latinos would prefer for their 
children to have more Latino teachers.102  
III. IMPROVING LOCAL MINORITY REPRESENTATION 
If we accept that improving minority representation at the local level is a valid 
goal, then how are we to achieve this improvement? Perhaps everything appears to 
be able to be changed by litigation or legislative change if one is a lawyer (much like 
a hammer sees everything as a nail), but I believe that there are great strides to be 
made through these two methods. The third, complementary, and in many ways a 
sine qua non of legal change, method is to engage in community organizing. That is 
beyond the scope of my expertise though, so I will leave it to others to comment on 
the best ways to integrate community organizing into a fully-fledged litigation and 
legislative advocacy campaign.  
A. Litigating over minority vote dilution 
The difficulty with using litigation to develop solutions to a complex problem 
like minority representation is that an impact case will set a precedent based on a 
unique factual scenario and with a single or limited set of remedies. In the case of 
minority representation, Thornburg v. Gingles was a watershed for minority 
representation because it set the floor—a base level of representation of people of 
color in the halls of power—below which the country would not return.103 
                                                 
Lovrich, Predicting the Employment of Minority Officers in U.S. Cities: OLS Fixed- Effect Panel Model 
Results for African American and Latino Officers for 1993, 1996, and 2000, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 377, 377–
79 (2005), http://nuweb.neu.edu/nhe/race and police emp.pdf. 
97  See Grace Hall Saltzstein, Black Mayors and Police Policies, 51 J. POL. 525, 525–44 (1989).  
98  See Belinda Creel Davis, Michelle Livermore & Younghee Lim, The Extended Reach of Minority 
Political Power: The Interaction of Descriptive Representation, Managerial Networking, and Race, 73 J. 
POL. 494, 497 (2011). 
99  David L. Leal, Valerie Martinez-Ebers & Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of Latino Education: The 
Biases of At-Large Elections, 66 J. POL. 1224, 1229–30 (2004). 
100  Id. at 1230–31. 
101  Id. at 1230. 
102  Id. at 1224. 
103  478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
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Unfortunately, Gingles has also come to represent a ceiling. That ceiling prevents the 
adoption of an election system that would allow for fairer representation for people of 
color. 
The concept of vote dilution was recognized as a constitutional harm in the 
“one person, one vote” (OPOV) Supreme Court cases of the 1960s.104 The Court found 
that an individual’s vote could be diluted if she was in an election district that had a 
huge disparity in population to another district for election to the same legislature. 
For example, in Baker v. Carr, districts for the state legislature in the urban centers 
of Tennessee had ten times the number of people as districts in rural areas.105 This 
meant that a voter in an urban district had one-tenth the voting power of a voter in a 
rural area. The court labeled the requirement of rough population equality106 a OPOV 
requirement:  
[A]ll who participate in the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race, 
whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever 
their home may be . . . . The concept of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes 
no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic 
qualifications.107 
The OPOV requirement recognizes that an individual’s vote can be diluted by the size 
of election districts. Minority vote dilution operates in a similar, but more complex 
way than individual vote dilution, and it describes a group rather than an individual 
harm.108 As Pamela S. Karlan explains, “[u]nlike the white suburban plaintiffs in 
Reynolds whose voting strength was diluted because of where they lived, the political 
power of Black citizens is diluted because of who they are.”109 
Thus, in 1971, in Whitcomb v. Chavis, a group of Black voters in Indiana 
argued that vote dilution could also occur based on race, rather than geography. 110 
The plaintiffs argued that by electing multiple legislators in the Marion County area 
using at-large elections, the Black community was left with “almost no political force 
                                                 
104  See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
105  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 253–267 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
106  The OPOV started as a rough population equality measure, but later was changed to require a 
population deviation of no more than one person for each congressional district (and at the state 
legislative and local level, the population requirement only allowed that the largest and smallest 
districts deviated by no more than 10%). See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730–41 (1983) 
(regarding congressional districts); Larios v. Cox, 305 F. Supp. 2d. 1335, 1337 (2004), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. 
2806 (2004) (citing Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983) (regarding state legislative 
districts)). 
107  Gray, 372 U.S. at 379–80. 
108  The concept of minority vote dilution was first hinted at in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), but 
not relied upon by the appellees, and so it was only briefly addressed by Justice Brennan writing for 
the Court. Id. at 439 (“It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multimember constituency 
apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or 
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.”). 
109  Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution 
Litigation, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 174 (1989). 
110  403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
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or control over legislators because the effect of their vote [was] cancelled out by other 
contrary interest groups.”111 The problem with winner-take-all, at-large elections 
(those where fifty-one percent of the community can elect one hundred percent of the 
representatives) is that “a slim majority of voters has the power to deny 
representation to all others.”112 The Court declined to find that there was in fact a 
constitutional violation caused by the use of at-large districts in Indiana, but it left 
open the question of whether, in the right factual scenario, the rights of minority 
voters might be diluted. 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs from Texas, in White v. Regester, convinced the 
Supreme Court that there was invidious discrimination in the drawing of the Texas 
legislative redistricting plan in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 113 The plaintiffs showed that “the political processes 
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the 
group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in 
the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their 
choice.”114 The court analyzed a number of practices that prevent political 
participation by Black voters in Dallas County and Latino voters in Bexar County. 
These included party slating, poll taxes, cultural barriers, and the use of multi-
member districts (MMDs) with at-large, winner-take-all plurality voting. 
Another set of plaintiffs tried to build on the theory of minority vote dilution 
as caused by at-large voting in MMDs from Regester to argue that such dilution was 
occurring in the city of Mobile, Alabama. In Mobile v. Bolden, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and Section 2 of the VRA, were 
violated by the City Commission’s election system that elected the three-person 
Commission at-large, thereby denying the Black population (that constituted 35.4% 
of the total population) the ability to elect a single candidate. 115 The Court held that 
there was no difference between the Fifteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA, 
and found that both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were not violated 
because a showing of purposeful discrimination was required for each, and such a 
purpose was not shown.116  
The holding in Bolden appeared to make it all but impossible for plaintiffs to 
overturn redistricting plans or election systems that diluted the minority vote. As 
Chandler Davidson describes, in the context of an attempted minority vote dilution 
case in the town of Taylor, Texas (where, despite high Latino turnouts in elections 
                                                 
111  Id. at 129. 
112  Fair Representation and the Voting Rights Act: Remedies for Racial Minority Vote Dilution Claims, 
FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/assets/Racial-Minority-Representation-Booklet.pdf (last visited Mar. 
14, 2015). 
113  412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973). 
114  Id. at 766. 
115  446 U.S. 55, 58–59 (1980). 
116  Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66–68 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
2017] Fair Representation in Local Government 217 
and Latino candidates running regularly for office between 1967 and 1974, no 
candidate that was the choice of the minority community was elected): 
The decision presented serious problems to the plaintiffs in Taylor, whose at-large 
system had been established in 1914. The files of the local newspaper only went back 
to the 1930s, and official city documents relating to the charter revision shed no light 
on the motives for the change. After much soul searching, the plaintiffs withdrew the 
suit, at the cost of three years of trial preparation, dashing the minorities lingering 
hopes that the U.S. Constitution might provide them relief.117 
The difficulties Bolden created were foremost on the minds of legislators when 
they amended Section 2 of the VRA in 1982. Congress added paragraph (b) to Section 
2 that explained that Section 2(a) could be violated if a “totality of circumstances” test 
was met, rather than the more stringent purposeful discrimination test of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The totality of the circumstances test means 
that plaintiffs can present evidence that an election system in effect dilutes the 
minority vote, along with examples of other types of racial discrimination that occur 
in the jurisdiction, rather than having to show that the particular election system 
was adopted with a racially discriminatory purpose. 
The amended Section 2 was used effectively in litigation immediately after 
1982, with the seminal case of Thornburg v. Gingles in 1986 establishing a three-part 
test that plaintiffs could meet in order to prove a Section 2 violation even if they could 
not prove that an election system was instituted for the purpose of discriminating 
with respect to voting on the basis of race. The Gingles test requires the racial, ethnic, 
or language minority group to prove that it is: 
(1) sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district; 
(2) politically cohesive; and 
(3) in the absence of special circumstances, that bloc voting by the white 
majority usually defeats the minority’s preferred candidate.118 
The Court will also look at factors identified by the Senate in the 1982 
amendment of Section 2. These factors clarify the “totality of circumstances” 
requirement in Section 2.119 Modern legal strategies to overcome minority vote 
dilution must still operate within the Gingles framework. However, this does not 
mean that the remedy imposed in Gingles (majority-minority SMDs with winner-
take-all plurality voting) must be applied wherever a Section 2 violation occurs. In 
addition, Section 2 litigation is not the only strategy that can be used to remove 
                                                 
117  Chandler Davison, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1, 2 (Chandler 
Davidson ed., 1984). 
118  Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 49–51. 
119  The list of Senate factors and a brief discussion of how they are used in litigation is available here: 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/about_sec2.php (last updated Aug. 8, 2015). 
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minority vote dilution. The remainder of this section compares the Gingles remedy to 
other election systems used in the United States to prevent minority vote dilution.  
B. Remedying Minority Vote Dilution: The Problem of Majority-Minority 
SMDs 
The benefits of the Gingles remedy are most clear where the fact scenario is 
similar to that in Gingles. That is, where an “at-large scheme consistently, 
systematically dilutes the voting strength of a geographically isolated racial or ethnic 
minority.”120 There are multiple reasons why this particular scenario is becoming less 
common, and therefore why systems other than majority-minority SMDs are more 
likely to protect the voting rights of racial and ethnic minorities. These reasons are 
discussed below. 
i. Decreasing Residential Segregation 
America is becoming less residentially segregated.121 
The movement of people of color into relatively white suburban areas causes 
those suburbs to become more diverse (in that they include people of multiple races 
and ethnicities) but not necessarily residentially integrated.  
Many of the areas that have new populations of color still have almost entirely 
white representation at the school board or local government level. In many cases 
this is because at-large districts are used to elect the local board. For example, the 
Hanover Park, Illinois, town council is all white, yet forty-four percent of the 
population is Black, Latino, or Asian American. 
The consequence of reduced segregation is that majority-minority SMDs 
cannot be drawn to protect the voting rights of people of color. The Gingles remedy 
only protects geographically compact minority communities. As long as people of color 
do not make up a majority of new neighborhoods and racially polarized voting 
persists,122 there will be no minority representation on local representative bodies. 
ii. Irregular Town Boundaries 
Unlike county boundaries, which are mostly square in Illinois, and school 
board boundaries, which are also fairly smooth, town boundaries are often uneven, 
winding in and out of communities, along some roads and not others, and very often 
including unincorporated areas within the town boundary. In order to keep SMDs as 
contiguous as possible (it may not be possible if the town itself is non-contiguous), 
                                                 
120  Jim Blacksher & Larry Menefee, At-Large Elections and One Person, One Vote: The Search for the 
Meaning of Racial Vote Dilution, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 203, 233 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). 
121  Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 1343–48.  
122  Racially polarized voting occurs when one racial or ethnic minority group prefers one candidate or set of 
candidates and a different racial or ethnic minority group prefers different candidates.  For example in 
Alabama in 2012, white voters voted for President Obama at a rate of about eight percent, while Black 
voters voted for the President at a rate of around ninety-eight percent.  This represents a huge polarity 
in voting preferences by race. 
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district boundaries can only be drawn in certain ways, which can prevent the drawing 
of majority-minority districts. 
iii. Lack of Minority Voting Cohesion 
There are a number of cities or school boards that have a combined minority 
population over fifty percent and yet, in at-large elections, all of the elected officials 
are white. It may be that minority voter turnout is lower than that of white voters. 
However, it could also be that the minority communities do not vote together to elect 
candidates of choice, so if the plurality of voters are white and vote cohesively, they 
will be able to elect all of the candidates for the local board. 
iv. Low Turnout or Lack of Candidates 
There are some city councils and school boards that are majority-minority or 
even plurality Black or Latino, and yet they continue to elect an all-white council or 
board. An explanation for this is lower voter turnout by the minority community. The 
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies notes that minority turnout in local 
elections is worse than white turnout (this does not always hold for federal general 
elections).123 As long as this situation continues, even with cumulative or ranked 
choice voting, it will be hard to improve minority representation. 
v. The Problem of Prison-Based Gerrymandering 
Prison-based gerrymandering occurs because prisoners are counted at their 
prison addresses by the U.S. Census Bureau, but they cannot actually vote. Thus, if 
a district is drawn to include a nearby prison, it will consist of far fewer actual eligible 
voters than a neighboring district (though they have the same total population). The 
most egregious example in the country is in the city of Anamosa, Iowa, where each 
City Council ward has around 1,370 people, but one ward has 1,321 prisoners and 58 
non-prisoners. This means that 58 people have the voting power of 1,370 for the city 
council.124  
In Illinois, the biggest distortion of prison gerrymandering occurs because sixty 
percent of the prison population comes from Cook County, yet ninety-nine percent of 
the population is housed and counted in districts outside of Cook County.125 This 
leads to less comparative urban representation and greater rural representation.  
vi. Growing Minority Populations 
                                                 
123  KHALILAH BROWN-DEAN, ZOLTAN HAJNAL, CHRISTINA RIVERS & ISMAIL WHITE, JOINT CTR. FOR POL. & 
ECON. STUD., 50 YEARS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: THE STATE OF RACE IN POLITICS 12–14, 
http://jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/VRA%20report%2C%208.5.15%20%28540%20pm%29%28update
d%29.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
124  See Prison Gerrymandering Project, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/impact.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2001). 
125  Id. 
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The Census only occurs every ten years and it is usually accompanied by 
redistricting (except where at-large elections with winner-take-all voting is used), but 
throughout the decade people move, citizens turn eighteen, and residents are 
naturalized. If fair representation systems are used, then the election system can 
ensure that as soon as a minority community is large enough to elect a candidate of 
their choice, they can do so. If at-large systems are used, then the jurisdiction does 
not need to change to SMDs or move district boundaries until it is sued under Section 
2 of the VRA or until the next census is released.  
vii. Problems with Majority-Minority Districts for the Black Population 
Many researchers have found that district-based elections increase Black 
representation when they replace winner-take-all at-large systems.126 Despite this, 
there are three main criticisms leveled at majority-minority districts for the Black 
community. First, as a matter of substantive representation, packing Black voters, 
who are predominantly Democratic, into single districts can create districts in the 
surrounding areas that are more Republican, resulting in the election of more 
Republicans to the legislature, which may be less likely to support the interests of 
the Black community.127 Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran found in 1996 that the 
1990 round of congressional redistricting’s focus on using majority-minority districts 
to ensure that communities of color could elect candidates of choice diluted the 
minority influence in surrounding areas and led to “an overall decrease in support for 
minority sponsored legislation.”128  
Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran believe that if SMDS are used, there is a 
tradeoff between increasing the number of minority officeholders and enacting 
legislation that furthers the interests of the minority community.  Their finding held 
true in the South, where they determined the optimal minority population in any 
district to be forty-seven percent (rather than over fifty percent as has been imposed 
                                                 
126   See Richard Engstrom & Michael McDonald, The Election of Blacks to City Councils: Clarifying the 
Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 344, 
344–54 (1981); Richard Engstrom & Michael McDonald, The Underrepresentation of Blacks on City 
Councils, 44 J. POL. 1088, 1089 (1982). See also Theodore Robinson & Thomas Dye, Reformism and 
Black Representation on City Councils, 59 SOC. SCI. Q. 133, 136–37 (1978); Joseph Stewart, Robert 
England & Kenneth Meier, Black Representation in Urban School Districts: From School Board to 
Office Classroom, 42 W. POL. Q. 287, 291(1989); ALBERT KARNIG & SUSAN WELCH, BLACK 
REPRESENTATION AND URBAN POLICY 134–49 (1980); see generally Richard Engstrom & Michael 
McDonald, The Effect of At-Large Versus District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. 
Municipalities, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 203, 203–25 (G. Bernard & A 
Lijphart eds., 1986).  
127  See, e.g., Charles Cameron, David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts 
Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 795 (1996) (finding 
a tradeoff “between maximizing the number of Black representatives in Congress and maximizing the 
number of votes in favor of minority-sponsored legislation”); David Epstein et al., Estimating the Effect 
of Redistricting on Minority Substantive Representation, 23 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 499, 505–06 (2007); 
Christine L. Sharpe & James C. Garand, Race, Roll Calls, and Redistricting: The Impact of Race-Based 
Redistricting on Congressional Roll-Call, 54 POL. RES. Q. 31, 44 (2001). 
128  Cameron et al., supra note 127, at 794.  
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by the Courts in Section 2 cases).129 Outside of the South, they found that 
“substantive minority representation is best served by distributing Black voters 
equally among all districts.”130 
A second criticism of majority-minority districts, articulated, by Professor 
Abigail Thernstrom, is that a preoccupation with creating majority Black districts 
entrenches the racial segregation of minority voters. Thernstrom argues that 
“minority representation might actually be increased not by raising the number of 
black officeholders [elected from Black districts] but by increasing the number of 
officeholders, black or white, who have to appeal to blacks to win.”131 
A version of this argument has been made by Professor Lani Guinier, who 
argues that “single-member districts may aggravate the isolation of the black 
representative”132 and possibly even lead to Black representatives being viewed as 
tokens that let the white majority feel that their role in the winning coalition has 
greater value.133 
In addition to opposing the tokenism of minority representation, Guinier 
highlights that the purpose of the VRA was—and the purpose of civil rights activists 
should be—minority empowerment, not just minority legislative presence.134 She has 
argued that the current interpretation of the VRA (to protect majority-minority 
districts seemingly at the expense of all other protections) has “‘inescapably closed 
the door’ on the real goal of the civil rights movement, which was to alter the material 
condition of the lives of America’s subjugated minorities.”135 Whether the door is 
closed is debatable, but the research in The Color of Representation shows that 
remedies other than SMDs will need to be used with more frequency if we are to 
improve the substantive representation of communities of color. 
A third criticism is leveled by the national organization FairVote, which has 
long argued that one of the main problems with majority-minority districts is that 
they “require the continuation of some degree of housing segregation that 
concentrates minority populations within easily drawn boundaries.”136 They 
elaborate: 
                                                 
129  Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17 (2009) (“We find support for the majority-minority requirement in 
the need for workable standards and sound judicial and legislative administration. The rule draws 
clear lines for courts and legislatures alike. The same cannot be said of a less exacting standard that 
would mandate crossover districts under § 2.”). 
130  Cameron et al., supra note 127, at 809. 
131  ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 21 
(1987); Voting Rights Trap: The Resegregation of the Political Process, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1985.  
132  GUINIER, supra note 35, at 81. 
133  Id. at 64. 
134  Id. at 55. 
135  Id. at 54. 
136  Robert Richie, Douglas Amy & Frederick McBride, New Means for Political Empowerment: 
Proportional Voting, POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL, Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 1, 10, as reprinted in 
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[A SMD system] has been effective for racial minorities and has remedied thousands 
of minority vote dilution lawsuits and dramatically increased racial minority 
representation where it has been applied. However, the effectiveness of majority-
minority districts as voting rights remedy is dependent upon the geographic 
concentration of racial minorities. Geographic dispersion can limit majority-minority 
districts to fewer seats than a given racial minority’s share of population. Even where 
districts provide an effective remedy in the short-term, they may not adequately 
represent the jurisdiction’s diversity after its demography changes. Finally, many 
racial minority voters will be unable to elect preferred candidates when not living in 
majority-minority districts.137 
viii. Problems with Majority-Minority Districts for the Latino Population 
SMDs do not increase descriptive representation for Latinos as much as they 
do for blacks and may actually decrease Latino descriptive representation. 
Latinos are not as segregated from whites or from other minority groups as are 
Blacks.138 This means that there are fewer places where it is even possible to draw a 
Latino majority-minority district. This is one of the major reasons why Latinos are 
more underrepresented than Blacks. Since the 1980s, Latinos have moved from more-
segregated to less-segregated areas, becoming more integrated with both white and 
Black Americans.139  
In addition, any attempt to enfranchise minority communities must take into 
account varying levels of citizenship and political incorporation.140 Even in 
communities where there are a significant number of Latinos who are American 
citizens, they may be still new enough to the country that they lack the social 
networks and community knowledge to run a successful campaign141 (and the 
community may be more resistant, especially in local races where candidates often 
run on a platform of how long they and their families have been in the community). 
In a city with low levels of citizenship and political incorporation, there may be one 
viable candidate and just enough Latino citizens across the city to elect that person, 
with a fair representation electoral system rather than SMDs with winner-take-all 
plurality voting system providing the only likelihood of that happening.  
The scenario of the city with a high number of Latino noncitizens represents a 
particularly important case for minority representation. In a single-member-district 
system, each candidate may not have enough Latino citizens to ever be concerned 
with the interests of Latinos because they do not influence his or her chances for re-
election. A system that allowed at least one Latino representative to be elected would 
then give that population some chance of having a voice.  
                                                 
137  Fair Representation and the Voting Rights Act: Remedies for Racial Minority Vote Dilution Claims, 
supra note 112. 
138  Paru Shah, Racing Toward Representation: A Hurdle Model of Latino Incorporation, 38 AM. POL. RES. 
84, 87. (2010). 
139  See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3. 
140  Id. at 88–89.  
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ix. Problems with Majority-Minority Districts for the Asian American 
Population 
SMDs with winner-take-all plurality voting are even more problematic for the 
Asian American population, because their population is comparatively low 
throughout the country, making it hard to draw majority Asian American districts in 
most places.142 New York City elections provide the clearest example of how SMDs 
have failed the Asian American population. The use of ranked choice voting in New 
York City school board elections from 1970 to 1999 led to descriptive representation 
of Asian Americans, “many with almost exclusive support from Asian American 
voters.”143 This result provided a “stark contrast” with the experiences of Asian 
American candidates in elections for other legislative bodies representing New York 
(that do not use ranked choice voting): in the late 1990s, “[e]ven with 800,000 Asian 
Americans, though there [we]re fifteen Asian American elected officials in the school 
boards, no Asian ha[d] been elected to the city council, state legislature, or 
Congress.”144 
C. Remedying Minority Vote Dilution: Fair Representation Systems 
Given the myriad of potential problems with using SMDs to improve minority 
representation, I recommend the use of “fair representation systems” to overcome 
these boundaries. Fair representation systems used in the United States include 
cumulative and ranked choice voting (where used with MMDs). Overall, fair 
representation systems ensure that “a majority cannot control the outcome of every 
seat up for election. Instead, they ensure that the majority wins the most seats, but 
guarantee[s] access to representation for those in the minority.”145 
Cumulative voting was used to elect the Illinois House of Representatives for 
more than a century (1870–1980)146 and was initially enacted to ensure that the 
minority party would have representation in a politically polarized state.147 
Cumulative voting is currently used in local elections in Alabama, California, Illinois, 
                                                 
142  California’s 49th state legislative district is the first majority Asian American state legislative district 
outside of Hawaii. See Daniela Gerson, California’s First Asian Majority Legislative District, ALHAMBRA 
SOURCE (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.alhambrasource.org/stories/californias-first-asian-majority-
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school boards were shifted to not being elected at all, which is why ranked choice voting is not used in 
the city today. 
144  Id. 
145  Fair Representation and the Voting Rights Act: Remedies for Racial Minority Vote Dilution Claims, 
supra note 112.   
146  Black Representation Under Cumulative Voting in IL, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=419 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
147  Effectiveness of Fair Representation Voting Systems for Racial Minority Voters, FAIRVOTE (Jan. 2015), 
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New York, South Dakota, and Texas,148 and ranked choice voting was previously used 
at the local level in Ohio and New York and is currently used in California, Maine, 
Minnesota, and Massachusetts.149 Overall, more than 100 jurisdictions in the United 
States currently use fair representation voting to elect their representatives.150  
Fair representation systems not only improve many measures of minority 
representation, but they also lead to improved democratic outcomes generally.  
i. Improved Minority Representation 
First and foremost, for my purposes, the benefit of fair representation systems 
is that they allow people of color to elect candidates of their choice, where winner-
take-all, at-large systems would, and SMD systems may, prevent them from doing so. 
As FairVote found, “in a study of 96 elections in 62 jurisdictions with cumulative 
voting or the single vote, black candidates were elected 96 percent of the time and 
Latino candidates 70 percent of the time when a black or Latino candidate ran.”151 
In New York:  
African Americans, [Latinos], and Asian Americans made up 37 to 47 percent of [the] 
City’s population during the three decades in which it used [ranked choice] voting for 
its school board elections. The minority groups won 35 percent to 57 percent of these 
positions, compared to only 5 percent to 25 percent of seats on the city council, which 
were elected using single-member districts.152 
During a period when the South elected zero Black representatives to Congress and 
State legislatures, Illinois’s cumulative voting system meant that at all times from 
1894 to 1980 there was at least one Black legislator in the Illinois House (and in most 
years there were many more than that) despite the Black population in the state 
averaging roughly fourteen percent throughout that period.153  
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Where fair representation systems have been implemented to remedy a Section 
2 violation, the system has resulted in communities of color being able to elect their 
candidates of choice and has improved descriptive representation. This has been 
shown for the Black, Latino, and Native American communities.154 
Ranked choice voting (RCV)) provides additional value for racial and ethnic 
minorities. Because it creates incentives for candidates to reach out to more voters, 
it tends to result in less racially polarized campaign tactics and more inclusion for 
racial minority voters. Even in single-winner, winner-take-all elections, ranked 
choice voting appears to have an impact. For example, the imposition of ranked choice 
voting in San Francisco and Oakland led to the first Asian American mayor being 
elected in San Francisco and to the first Asian American—and first female—mayor 
being elected in Oakland.155 In San Francisco, of eighteen offices elected by RCV, 
sixteen are held by people of color—up from nine when RCV was first used in 2004.156 
The ability of communities of color to elect candidates of their choice in fair 
representation systems is not limited to groups that are residentially segregated, 
which, as Nicholas Stephanopoulos has argued, is more equitable because “[s]patially 
dispersed groups are just as deserving of representation” as segregated ones.157 This 
ability also means that all members of a community of color in a jurisdiction can have 
a say in who is elected to represent that community of color, rather than just those 
people of color that happen to live in the majority-minority district.  
ii. Cross-Racial Coalition Building 
As well as improving descriptive representation and allowing communities of 
color to elect candidates of their choice, fair representation systems have also been 
shown to foster the construction of cross-racial coalitions among both voters and 
legislators.158 This is particularly true for RCV, given that voters have every incentive 
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discussing the fact that in many places the Asian American community will be too small to reach the 
threshold of exclusion. This is less relevant in Illinois because there are local jurisdictions with an 
Asian American population much greater than the three percent he writes of. 
156  Richard DeLeon & Arend Lijphart, In Defense of Ranked Choice Voting, SFGATE (Jan. 22, 2013, 6:49 
PM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/In-defense-of-ranked-choice-voting-4215299.php. 
157  Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 847, n.3. 
158  FairVote’s Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 154, at 16 (citing Steven J. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out: A 
Remedial Map for the Use of Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Act Remedies, 77 N.C. L. 
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to rank candidates outside their own racial group (in addition to selecting their 
preferred candidate in the number one position). Even when voters in a racial 
minority are below the threshold of exclusion necessary to elect their most preferred 
candidate, their second choice vote will be sought after by multiple candidates, 
possibly from a variety of racial, ethnic, and political backgrounds.  
iii. Increased Representation for All Political Minorities 
Fair representation systems show huge benefits to racial minorities, but they 
may also “open up the political process for politically cohesive minorities, not just 
racial minorities.”159 In addition to the minority political party being able to gain 
representation, other demographic minorities can also have a better chance at being 
elected.  For example, alternative election systems can lead to greater diversity by 
gender, age, religion, sexuality, or country of origin, depending on the communities 
of interest in the jurisdiction. 
iv. Reduced Partisan Polarization 
Cumulative voting in Illinois historically increased “the variance of the policy 
views held by both Democratic and Republican members of the state house.”160 This 
holds not just historically for Illinois but has also been suggested as a way to reduce 
polarization across the board in modern America: “[i]f one’s greatest concern in a . . . 
legislature is partisan gridlock, multi-member districts could potentially ease the 
partisan feuding by making each party more ideologically diverse.”161 
v. Improved civic engagement 
Fair representation systems can lead to improved civic engagement by 
communities of color. For example, a study of cumulative voting “found that their 
elections feature higher turnout, more active campaigning by candidates, greater 
mobilization by outside groups, and more contested races than either single-member 
districts or at-large regimes” and “voters worldwide in preferential systems [for 
example, ranked choice voting] exhibit greater satisfaction with democracy and are 
more likely to believe their elections are conducted fairly.”162 
 
                                                 
REV. 1867, 1903 (1999)) (citing Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the 
United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 297 (1995)). 
159  GUINIER, supra note 35, at 71. 
160  Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 855. 
161  Id. (quoting Greg D. Adams, Legislative Effects of Single-Member Vs. Multi-Member Districts, 40 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 129, 141–42 (1996); see also Gary W. Cox, Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral 
Systems, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 903, 927 (1990) (“In multimember districts, cumulation promotes a 
dispersion of competitors across the ideological spectrum.”). 
162  Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 851–52. 
2017] Fair Representation in Local Government 227 
vi. Removal of Race Conscious Districting 
While many racial justice advocates do not accept that redistricting should 
avoid being race conscious, there are skeptics in the community and on the Supreme 
Court163 of an over-zealous focus on race in redistricting164 and in remedying past 
discrimination generally.165 For these critics, fair representation systems may be 
more acceptable than SMD systems because they “do not compel any consideration of 
race in their design or operation. They promise levels of minority representation 
comparable to those produced by Section 2, but without any of the ‘dividing’ and 
‘segregating’ that are sometimes linked to the provision.”166  
IV. APPLYING THE THEORY: THREE CASE STUDIES 
Armed with the knowledge that I could help my community by improving 
minority representation, in particular through the use of fair representation systems, 
I set out to find communities to work with on these important issues.  
The overwhelming lesson from these efforts was that creating change at the 
local level is tough but possible. Some of the constraints include that there are limited 
resources to support local organizing efforts; the central authorities are powerful and 
able to control, or even manipulate, the ballot initiative process, and litigation is 
costly and time consuming. In this section, I present three stories from communities 
that I have worked with on minority representation issues. None can be considered a 
complete success, but all show that there is some hope for positive change if attorneys 
and community members work hard together toward common goals. 
A. Joliet…The Dice Were Loaded from the Start 
Joliet is the fourth largest city in Illinois, with a population of almost one 
hundred and fifty thousand people.167 The heart of Joliet is about an hour’s train ride 
southwest of downtown Chicago. Joliet has seen a large increase in its minority 
population from 1990 to 2010. As of the 2010 Census, Joliet was approximately fifty-
three percent white, twenty-eight percent Latino, sixteen percent Black, and two 
percent Asian American.168 It had eight council members, of which two were Black, 
                                                 
163  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Schs. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
164  See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 
(1993). 
165  Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
166  Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 908–12 (1994); Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 849.  
  
167  Quick Facts: Joliet City, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/1738570 (last visited Nov. 18, 2016).  
168  Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_age_population_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap.html (last 
updated Feb. 10, 2016) (All numbers reported in this section are calculated using the following Census 
demographics: “white:” non-Hispanic white; “Latino:” Hispanic or Latino origin; “Black:” non-Hispanic 
Black plus non-Hispanic Black+White; “Asian American:” non-Hispanic Asian plus non-Hispanic 
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and six were non-Hispanic white. The city council was chosen from five single-
member districts (of which two were majority-minority) and three council members 
were elected at-large. I have been privileged to work with the Concerned Citizens of 
Joliet (CCJ) and Jorge Sanchez of the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund. Jorge and I have attended multiple local meetings, discussions, 
education sessions, church events, and fairs to discuss redistricting with the local 
community. By 2014, Joliet was ready for change. 
The CCJ is a multi-generational, multi-ethnic, multi-religious organization 
that focuses on helping all the people of Joliet—not just the wealthy elites. CCJ 
worked effectively as a diverse coalition to prevent a for-profit immigration detention 
prison from being erected in Joliet. High from their victory on this important issue, 
the group set out to tackle a new issue. The CCJ decided that they could not 
sufficiently hold their city council accountable for its policy positions and suspected 
that the redistricting system was to blame. 
CCJ sensed that the redistricting system was unfair, with almost all of the city 
council members living in the tiny (and comparatively wealthy) “Cathedral District”, 
leaving the south, east, and west sides all without a council member close to them. 
This resulted, they believed, in an unequal distribution of resources (trash and snow 
are quickly cleaned up in the center of town, but left for days on the outskirts; the 
center of town has its parks upgraded while the edge of town has chain link fences 
and broken playground equipment); and there was a lack of awareness of the concerns 
of the outlying areas, in particular those that pertain to the Black and Latino 
communities.  
The CCJ developed a campaign “Joliet for 8 districts,” seeking to place an 
initiative on the ballot asking the city to vote to have eight single-member districts. 
In 2016, the CCJ submitted their signatures for this proposition for the third time, 
and for a third time were blocked from the ballot. There have been a series of 
roadblocks to their community action, well beyond the usual struggles of a meagerly 
funded volunteer group seeking to create change. 
One initial challenge I faced as a practitioner was that the CCJ had already 
decided that they wanted eight SMDs. I had wanted to articulate the benefits of 
ranked choice voting and MMDs (at least for the three already at-large seats), but the 
community found that option to be foreign to its experiences, and the community had 
already decided that having council members be geographically spread across the 
town was of prime importance to them. This experience led me to refine the ways I 
present ranked choice voting discussions to community groups and helped me to 
understand that there is more to representation than just descriptive and substantive 
issues—spatial patterns (of communities and candidates) are intertwined with our 
beliefs about effective representation. 
                                                 
Asian+White. Other races and ethnicities make up the remainder of the population, but are not 
reported in every case. American Community Survey 2010–14).  
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i. The Ballot Initiative Strategy 
To place an initiative on the ballot in Illinois, a home rule county,169 a group 
must gather the number of signatures equal to eight percent of the vote in that 
jurisdiction for governor in the most recent election. In 2014, when the CCJ first 
gathered signatures, the local authorities were not able to determine how many 
signatures they actually required because the gubernatorial vote is collected at the 
precinct and county level, and the city crosses two counties and splits some twenty 
precincts.  
A local citizen—with connections to the incumbent council members—
challenged the signatures gathered by the CCJ in 2014, resulting in the challenger, 
the CCJ (and Jorge and I with them), and the authorities holding a week of hearings 
and signature review sessions to determine whether the CCJ had met the statutory 
signature requirement. The most farcical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, aspect 
of the whole week was that the local review board (staffed, by Illinois statute, by the 
mayor, a current city council member, and the city attorney)170 was informed that we 
would not be told how many signatures needed to be gathered until the number of 
signatures had been counted. Somewhat unsurprisingly, it turned out, a week later, 
that the number of signatures needed was just a few hundred more than those that 
had been validated. In addition to this, another questionable legal decision was made 
by the city council member on the local review board: he refused to recuse himself 
despite the fact he was elected from one of the three at-large positions and therefore 
subject to be removed if the ballot initiative went ahead and was approved.  
Aside from the review board process, the room where signatures were validated 
quickly degenerated into a power play, as the county staff members claimed that 
people who had moved away from the address where they signed the petition could 
not be counted as a valid signature. The Illinois statutes are unclear on this point, so 
it was left to the local review board to decide how to interpret the law, resulting—
again unsurprisingly—with those signatures being considered invalid. 
One of the volunteer signature gatherers with the CCJ had toured a local short-
term housing facility, Evergreen Terrace, to gather hundreds of signatures. Another 
CCJ member was a pastor to this community, and the residents there represent 
exactly the people that CCJ was trying to enfranchise (poor, predominantly minority, 
often sick and/or struggling with homelessness). Many of these residents of Evergreen 
Terrace had moved since signing the petition (the signature gathering had been going 
for around nine months by the time the signatures were reviewed). The review board 
decision meant that hundreds of signatures from these eligible voters were 
invalidated.  
At the lowest ebb in the signature review week, I sat with one of the Latino 
leaders of the CCJ as she listened to the staff laugh at the “hard to pronounce names” 
of her neighbors, get confused as to whether someone was a duplicate signatory 
                                                 
169  ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(a) (All towns over 25,000 are automatically home rule counties.).  
170  10 ILCS § 10–9(3). 
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because the Latino “names were so similar,” and joke about how they had not 
bothered to learn Spanish in school.  
After this unfair and, frankly, humiliating process, the CCJ pulled themselves 
back together to try to put the issue on the next ballot, in the local elections for 2015, 
but with the bulk of signature gathering occurring during the freezing winter months, 
they were unable to reach the target number of signatures. 
In August 2016, the CCJ again submitted nearly four thousand signatures. 
They still did not know exactly how many signatures were needed because one of the 
two counties that Joliet sits in refused to respond to multiple letters requesting the 
target number. The estimate in the previous hearing was around 2,800. 
The current mayor of Joliet was previously a council member and he had 
signed the 2014 petition to place the question on the ballot—he believed the people 
should get to vote on the question. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the petition was 
challenged (this time by the county clerk herself), and despite excellent pro bono 
representation from a large Chicago firm, the CCJ again lost their bid to place the 
question on the ballot. 
In response to the outcry over the third petition being rejected, the Mayor 
appointed a Latina to the City Council.  The person has no connection to CCJ or the 
communities they represent, and so it remains to be seen whether this will be a step 
forward or backward for minority representation in Joliet. 
ii. Litigation 
The demographics have changed in Joliet since 2010. In particular, many of 
the Latino community has turned 18 or gained citizenship, such that even in 2015, 
there was a large enough Latino and Black citizen voting age population that if they 
continued to vote together to elect candidates of their choice, three majority-minority 
districts could be drawn. There is no doubt that with updated census data, this figure 
will rise. 
It is likely that the CCJ will have a viable Section 2 case if the Latina that was 
appointed to the Council is not elected to her position (and in particular if she is not 
elected with evidence of racially polarized voting), but with VRA litigation being so 
complex, expensive, and time intensive, it is unlikely that the VRA will provide a 
change for the CCJ members before the next census is taken. The CCJ will need to 
get the resources for political science experts, discovery, and court fees to show that 
if the city were divided into eight districts, three would be majority-minority (without 
race predominating in the drawing of the districts).  
It is quite possible that by the time the next full census results are released in 
2021, Joliet will be majority-minority—perhaps even using the Citizen Voting Age 
Population (CVAP). This could result in a bizarre reversal of incentives by the 
majority white council members. For white voters to be represented at close to 
proportional level in a majority-minority town, the city council would favor removing 
the at-large seats. If it came to this, at least the CCJ would have their preference for 
council members who live closer to their constituents realized, even if it takes 
nefarious reasoning to get there. 
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B. An Accidental Win in Blue Island 
Blue Island is a small city immediately south of the border of Chicago. It has a 
population of just over twenty-three thousand, of which twenty-one percent are white, 
forty-seven percent are Latino, and thirty percent are Black.171 When CVAP is used, 
the white population grows to twenty-nine percent, the Black population grows to 
thirty-eight percent, while the Latino population drops to just thirty percent. Blue 
Island, like Chicago to its north, is still fairly segregated, particularly for the Black 
community. 
i. Pushing for Public Hearings 
In 2015, when we172 met with the Citizens in Action Serving All (CASA) group 
in Blue Island, there were seven two-member districts constituting their council. Of 
the fourteen members, two were Latino and two Black. There was no majority Latino 
district and only two majority Black districts.  
We spent a few weekends sitting down with local community members, 
showing them the mapping capabilities of Maptitude for Redistricting and discussing 
where they would prefer the district lines to be drawn. We had to consciously remind 
the excited rooms that it was not likely that we would be able to get the Council to 
adopt the plan we wanted, but that knowing what the districts are and could be would 
be helpful in itself. 
As we suspected, we were able to draw a plan using the most recent CVAP 
data, with three majority Black districts and one majority Latino district. We then 
needed a way to convince the council (or a court) to adopt a new plan. Blue Island 
does not have home rule, so it was not possible to use a ballot initiative to create 
change. Strangely, Blue Island had not redrawn its city council districts since 1996, 
and as two census counts had come and gone, the districts were in violation of the one 
person, one vote (OPOV) requirement of the federal Constitution.173 We were able to 
use this as leverage to ask the council to hold public hearings to redraw the seven 
districts, and the CASA group advocated for the plan with four majority-minority 
districts. 
After two months of Council hearings and public hearings of the Council’s 
Redistricting Subcommittee to discuss possible district plans, the City Council 
surprised no one by voting to adopt its own district plan. The major difference 
between the CASA plan and the city council plan was that the latter protected 
incumbents, while the former was drawn without regard for current council members. 
CASA opposed the protection of incumbents at the public hearings, but the council 
opted to protect its self-interest in its vote. 
                                                 
171  Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP), supra note 168. All numbers are reported for 
non-Hispanic white, Latino, non-Hispanic Black plus non-Hispanic Black+White. Other races and 
ethnicities make up the remainder of the population, but are not reported here. American Community 
Survey 2010–2014 
https://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_age_population_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap.html. 
172  My colleague Annabelle Harless and I worked with CASA together throughout the work in Blue Island. 
173  Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
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By good fortune (and the not-unexpected increase in the proportion of Blue 
Island that is Black or Latino), the new CVAP data (the 2011–15 estimates) was 
released by the Census Bureau a few days before the council’s final vote. CASA was 
able to tell the council before their vote that even though they disliked that the plan 
protected incumbents, they were pleased that it too had three majority Black and one 
majority Latino district. The next election in Blue Island will now include four of 
seven districts with a majority of people of color. Hopefully the communities of color 
can respond to this good news by electing their preferred candidates across the city. 
ii. Online Public Redistricting 
Another notable aspect of our work in Blue Island was that we decided to use 
a free trial of a service called iRedistrict,174 to make map drawing available to the 
community online. iRedistrict’s main power as a piece of software is its ability to draw 
random simulations of districts. We were using it for a slightly different purpose: to 
allow the public to make changes to the old redistricting plan, or the CASA plan, or 
to create their own new plan, and to see the demographic effects of such changes in 
real time.  
In addition to using iRedistrict, we placed Keyhole Markup Language (KMZ) 
files and descriptions of data onto the Google Maps Engine, and thereby made the 
statistics (and boundaries) of current, and various proposed plans, available to 
anyone with a network connection (we also displayed these tools at the Redistricting 
Committee Public Hearings). 
The community was reluctant to embrace iRedistrict, likely because the editing 
aspect of the software had sufficient bugs as to make the map drawing process quite 
frustrating for the casual user. In total, we only had seven users sign up to use the 
online map drawing software.  
To our surprise though, the Google Maps Engine districts and statistics were 
viewed over one thousand times and used by local media in their reporting of the case. 
Each public hearing had around thirty, and at times more than fifty, people in 
attendance (largely thanks to letter box pamphlets distributed by Mark and Kathy 
Kuehner of CASA). I believe we showed that there is an interest, even in a small 
community considering very local issues, in using online tools to better understand 
local government, and it is likely that this interest can be harnessed and enlarged 
through online organizing tools. 
Overall, Blue Island was a success to the extent that CASA and the community 
will now have districts that are constitutional and will have the possibility of electing 
candidates of choice of the minority community to a majority of the council seats. Blue 
Island also showed the utility of online redistricting tools in community organizing 
                                                 
174  See iRedistric®: Smart Redistricting Software for Territory Mapping with Powerful Optimization, 
ZILLION INFO, http://zillioninfo.com/product/iRedistrict (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (iRedistrict® is an 
award-winning redistricting software with powerful optimization algorithms, intuitive user controls, 
easy editing interface, and customizable reporting. It received two National Science Foundation (NSF) 
SBIR Awards in 2013 and 2014.). 
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around this issue. We were not able to prevent council members from focusing on 
their own self-interest in their vote for new districts, but very few jurisdictions are 
ever able to achieve such a feat. 
C. Crete-Monee School Board Ten Years On 
In our research into local redistricting in Illinois, we tried to find success 
stories—places where minority representation had increased and the community was 
in a better place because of it. We reviewed all the prior Section 2 cases from Illinois 
and thought that the Crete-Monee School District case looked particularly promising.  
Crete-Monee School District had been sued in the late 1980s175 over a possible 
Section 2 violation. By the mid-1990s, the case eventually resulted in a consent 
decree, and as a result the board started electing Black representatives to the school 
board.176 As of March 2017, the school board has three Black and four white members, 
and the president is an African American.177 
We set up a meeting with Dr. Hall, the president of the school board, to find 
out all the ways that the diverse board was helping the community. Dr. Hall agreed 
that the diverse board was better able to ensure racial equity in the school policies 
and procedures, and the district report card suggests the district is at or just below 
average on most statewide metrics,178 but Dr. Hall lamented that the diverse board 
had not resulted in better racial relations in the community. In 2015, the district 
successfully defended against a challenge to part of the consent decree, and not-at-all 
subtle racial overtones were used in local school board election campaigns (one 
campaign sought to “change the face” of the school board). 
V. THE ROAD AHEAD 
As long as there are communities willing to push for change to local 
redistricting practices, we practitioners must make ourselves aware of the best 
possible strategies and tactics we can use to help communities seek better outcomes. 
A. Federal Litigation 
Federal Section 2 litigation can be pursued to remedy the most egregious cases 
of minority vote dilution, where the minority population in question is geographically 
concentrated. 
 
                                                 
175  Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 46 F.3d 682, 683 (7th Cir. 1995). 
176  Consent Decree – Agreed Order 08/13/1998, CRETE-MONEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 201-U, 
http://www.cm201u.org/index.aspx?nid=4146.  
177  See Crete-Monee School District 201-U Board of Education, CRETE-MONEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 201-U, 
http://www.cm201u.org/index.aspx?NID=139 (last visited March 6, 2017). 
178  See, e.g., Crete-Monee CUSD 201 U. ILL. REPORT CARD (2015–2016), 
http://illinoisreportcard.com/District.aspx?districtId=56099201U26. 
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B. Section 2 Remedies 
A jurisdiction found to violate Section 2 is able to choose how it will remedy the 
violation179 and, with the approval of the court, can then implement the new system. 
In many cases, jurisdictions choose to adopt SMDs, but not in every case. Recently, a 
defendant in Port Chester, New York, was able to implement cumulative voting to 
remedy a Section 2 violation, over the objection of the plaintiff.180 Many jurisdictions 
in Alabama that were forced to change from at-large elections after the long running 
Dillard litigation chose to adopt cumulative or single voting in the 1980s and 
1990s.181 
Thus far, no jurisdiction has chosen to adopt ranked choice voting in response 
to a Section 2 violation. However, it was requested (and approved by the court) as a 
remedy to a potential Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE Act) 
violation in Alabama in 2013,182 and it was used for overseas voters in a similar way 
in four additional states in 2014 (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina).183 
Pam Karlan has argued since 1989 that Section 2 remedies can be innovative 
and non-traditional.184 She explains: 
Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable 
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in 
equitable remedies . . . . Congress squarely stated that a court faced with a violation 
of Section 2 must ‘exercise its traditional equitable powers so that it completely 
remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal 
opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their 
choice.’ A court faced with a violation ‘cannot authorize a remedy . . . that will not 
with certitude completely remedy the Section 2 violation.’185 
 
Courts have rejected remedies that have been proposed by defendants and explained 
how options provided by the plaintiff will remedy the section violation better,186 but 
ultimately the defendant is able to determine the remedy for a Section 2 violation. 
The remedies in Alabama included not only cumulative voting but also an increase 
in the number of commissioners from four to seven and the institution of a system 
whereby the commission chairmanship would rotate between commissioners, 
                                                 
179  Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2000). 
180  United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
181  Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 241, 263–66 (1995).  
182  United States v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926 (11th Cir. 2015). 
183  Dania N. Korkor, Overseas Voters from 5 States to Use Ranked Choice Voting Ballots in 2014 
Congressional Election, FAIRVOTE BLOG (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-
analysis/blog/overseas-voters-from-5-states-to-use-ranked-choice-voting-ballots-in-2014-congressional-
election/. 
184  Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution 
Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 173, 218–19 (1989). 
185  Id. at 219. 
186  See Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 831 F.2d 246, 250–253 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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allowing a Black commissioner to occasionally be chairman, if one had been elected.187 
These provisions were implemented upon the recommendation of a “special master,” 
a magistrate with the federal court. The Supreme Court’s finding in Holder v. Hall 
has now limited the ability of a court to impose a remedy requiring an increase in the 
number of districts in an election jurisdiction in response to a Section 2 violation,188 
but there has been no limitation on the type of election system that can be used to 
remedy a Section 2 violation. 
The most promising avenue to use to argue for fair representation systems 
comes from the myriad of cases that have dealt with the question of imposing a 
remedy to a statewide redistricting violation. In these cases, defendants have argued 
that particular proposed remedial plans do not fully remedy the constitutional or 
statutory error. The remedial phase of redistricting cases is within the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction, and since 1972 the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
“scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for 
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”189 Though broad, “[t]he 
remedial powers of an equity court . . . are not unlimited.”190 It is the court’s duty to 
navigate between seeking a remedy to an unconstitutional redistricting plan and 
minimizing the disturbance of legitimate state policies.191  
There are cases where courts have explicitly overruled the imposition of 
remedies by the legislature, and these cases should be used to push for fair 
representation remedies. In one case, the reason the Court chose to draw its own plan 
was because the Court found that “[i]n its record of doggedly clinging to an obviously 
unconstitutional plan, the Legislature has left us no basis for believing that, given 
yet another chance, it would produce a constitutional plan.”192 In that case, the Court 
explained that it could not “turn a blind eye on the record of the Legislature.”193  
In addition to the difficulties at the remedies phase, additional difficulties of 
federal Section 2 litigation include:194 
 “[v]oting rights suits are actually among the most time- and labor-intensive 
of all actions brought before the federal courts;”195 
 attorneys’ fees do not necessarily follow from a victory and the cost of 
litigating a Section 2 case is extremely high; and 
                                                 
187  Dillard v. Chilton Cty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007). 
188  Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994). 
189  Sixty-Seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 191 (1972) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).  
190  Id. (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 199 (1971)). 
191  Id. at 202. 
192  Hays v. State of La., 936 F. Supp. 360, 372 (W.D. La. 1996). 
193  Id. 
194  See Paige Epstein, Addressing Minority Vote Dilution Through State Voting Rights Acts (U. Chi. Pub. 
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 the defendant is allowed to choose how to remedy a violation and so can 
implement a new election system that meets a bare minimum requirement of 
representation of the minority population. 
C. State Voting Rights Acts 
Given the potential difficulties associated with federal Section 2 litigation, 
implementing a state voting rights act (and then suing in state courts) may be a better 
alternative in some states. 
California has instituted a remedy to alleviate some of the problems of Section 
2 litigation by enacting a California Voting Rights Act (CVRA) that makes it cheaper 
and easier to prove that a local government’s election system impermissibly dilutes 
the votes of the minority community. The CVRA does not require fair representation 
remedies, but such systems could be imposed as a remedy in future state acts.196 
An additional benefit of developing a state level jurisprudence on minority vote 
dilution is that it can fill the gaps left in the current Section 2 jurisprudence. For 
example, the Gingles criteria for Section 2 liability are based on the assumption that 
SMDs are the appropriate benchmark for minority vote dilution when, in fact, the 
SMD requirement effectively overlooks the dilution of non-compact minority 
populations. As a result, a place where a crossover district can be drawn (districts 
where a racial minority votes as a bloc with a small amount of support from the white 
majority, resulting in the candidate of choice of the racial minority being elected) will 
not establish liability under Section 2 and so cannot be required by federal law.  
State Voting Rights Acts can be tailored to local needs, but in all cases if they 
include provisions that explicitly allow for fair representation systems to be imposed 
in response to a violation, and if they make the proving of a violation less burdensome 
than the federal VRA, then they will be a useful tool in the fight for improved minority 
representation in local government. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Striving for fair representation systems in local government is an important 
way to promote minority representation, and thereby fulfill the promise of our 
democracy. I encourage all practitioners to use the ideas and arguments in this paper 
to improve local government across the country.  
 
                                                 
196  For example, Santa Clarita chose to adopt cumulative voting as a settlement to a CVRA lawsuit. Drew 
Spencer, “California City of 180,000 to Provide Cumulative Voting Rights” FairVote Press Release 
(March 12, 2014), http://www.fairvote.org/newsletters-media/e-newsletters/california-city-of-180000-to-
provide-cumulative-voting-rights-/ (last visited March 15, 2015). Note, though, that jurisdictions found 
liable under Section 2 VRA can also choose to adopt cumulative voting, but they cannot be required to 
do so. 
